Abstract. In [ZMI89,ZMI90] two constructions for a collision resistant hash function were proposed. The first scheme is based on a block cipher, and the second scheme uses modular arithmetic. It is shown in this paper that both proposals have serious weaknesses.
Introduction
For an informal definition of a collision resistant hash function the reader is referred to [PGV92] . The following model will be used to described iterated hash functions:
Here f is the round function, X i are the t message blocks, H i are the chaining variables, H 0 is equal to the initial value, that should be specified together with the scheme, and H t is the hashcode. It was shown by I. Damgård [Dam89] that if the round function f is a collision resistant function, h is a collision resistant hash function. The authors of [ZMI89, ZMI90] claim that their constructions yield a collision resistant round function. It will be demonstrated that in both cases the round function is not collision resistant, and that in some cases collisions for h can be constructed.
The Hash Function Based on a Block Cipher
The round function f compresses a 224-bit input to a 128-bit output and is based on xDES 1 . This block cipher is one of the extensions of DES [Fi46] that has been proposed in [ZMI89b] . xDES 1 is a three round Feistel cipher with block length 128 bits, key size 168 bits and with the F function equal to DES. One round is defined as follows:
The variables C1 i and C2 i are 64-bit blocks, and K i are 56-bit keys. The block cipher is then written as
Here C1 0 and C2 0 are the first and second part of the plaintext, and C2 3 and C1 3 are the first and second part of the ciphertext. The collision resistant function consists of 2 xDES 1 operations:
Here Y 1 and Y 2 are 112-bit blocks, α is a 128-bit constant, β is a 56-bit initialization variable and chop r drops the r least significant (or rightmost) bits of its argument. The complete hash function has the following form:
where H i−1 is a 128-bit block, and X i is a 96-bit block. The rate of this scheme is equal to 4, which means that 4 DES encryptions are required to hash 64 bits. The scheme has two weaknesses, that allow to produce collisions for the round function f . First only 56 bits are kept from the first xDES 1 encryption, and hence a birthday attack will require only 2 29 operations to produce a collision for the intermediate value and hence for the function f . The second problem is that if β = K 1 and Y 1 = K 2 K 3 , one can use the key collision search algorithm described in [QD89] to produce key collisions for the DES plaintext equal to the second part of α. This yields a collision for f in about 2 33 operations. The scheme can be strengthened however by distributing β equally over K 1 , K 2 , and K 3 , and by increasing the size of β [Zhe92] . It will be shown that independently of the size of β, the security level can not be larger than 44 bits. If the size of β is equal to v bits (in the original proposal v = 56), the number of fixed bits of β that enter the key port of a single DES block is equal to v/3 (it will be assumed that v is divisible by 3). It can be shown that the rate of this scheme is then equal to R = 6·64 208−2v . The number of bits of Y 1 that enter the key port will be denoted with y, hence y + v/3 = 56. Two attacks are now considered.
For the fixed value of the right part of α and of the first v/3 bits of β, one can calculate and store a set of 2 z different ciphertexts. The probability that a collision will be found in this set is approximately equal to 2 2z−65 . If y > 32, implying v < 72, a value of z = 33 is clearly sufficient to obtain a collision. If on the other hand y ≤ 32, one will take z = y, and the probability of success is smaller than one. One can however repeat this procedure, (e.g., if one attacks a DES block different from the first one, a different value can be chosen for the value of the bits of Y 1 that enter the first DES), and the expected number of operations for a single collision is equal to 2 65−y , while the required storage is equal to 2
y . An extension of the Quisquater algorithm [QD89] could be used to eliminate the storage. If the security level S is expressed in bits, it follows that S = max {65 − y, 33}. With the relation between y and v, one obtains S = max {9 + v/3, 33}.
A second attack follows from the observation that only v bits are kept from the output of the first xDES 1 operation (hence the chop operation is chopping 128 − v bits). It is clear that finding a collision for the remaining v bits requires only 2 v/2+1 operations, or S ≤ v/2 + 1 bits. This attack is more efficient than the first attack if v < 64 bits.
The relation between S and v can be summarized as follows: if v < 64 then S = v/2 + 1, if 64 ≤ v < 72 then S=33, and if 72 ≤ v < 104 then S = v/3 + 9. One can conclude that producing a collision for the proposed round function requires less than 2 44 operations. Depending on the allocation of the bits of X i and H i−1 to Y 1 and Y 2 , it might also be feasible to produce a collision for the hash function with a fixed initial value: it is certainly possible to produce a collision for the hash function if there is a single DES block where all key bits are selected from X i .
The Hash Function Based on Modular Arithmetic
In this case the round function f consists of 2 modular squarings with an n-bit modulus (with n = 500):
where chop' r (x) drops the r most significant bits of x, Y 1 and Y 2 are 450-bit blocks, and β is a 50-bit initialization variable. The complete hash function has the following form:
, where H i−1 is a 500-bit block, and X i is a 400-bit block. The security of this scheme is based on the fact that O(log N ) bits of squaring modulo N is hard if N is a Blum integer, i.e., N = pq with p ≡ q ≡ 3 mod 4. From this it is wrongly concluded that finding two integers such that their squares agree at the 50 least significant positions is hard (a trivial collision for x is x = −x). As only 50 bits of the first squaring are used as input to the second squaring, it follows that collisions can be found with a birthday attack in 2 26 operations. It can be shown that one can find a second preimage and hence a collision for f even if k = n/4 bits are selected, or 3n/4 bits are chopped. The algorithm is the same as the one presented in [Gir87] to break a related scheme with redundancy in the least significant positions.
